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       D. Michael Fisher 
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       John G. Knorr, III (argued) 
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       Appellate Litigation Section 
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       429 Forbes Avenue 
       Pittsburgh, PA 15219 
 
       Cathy Bissoon (argued) 
       Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay, LLP 
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       Pittsburgh, PA 15219 
 
        ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 
Appellee, Raymond T. Pryer, a state prisoner, filed a civil 
rights action against a number of prison guar ds claiming 
that they had assaulted him in two separate incidents. A 
jury found that some of the guards had acted r easonably 
but found four others liable and awarded Pryer $1.00 in 
damages. Thereafter, the District Court, on its own motion, 
ordered a new trial, limiting its scope solely to the issue of 
damages. In the retrial, the court prevented the defendants 
from arguing that some of the guar ds no longer in the case 
had caused Pryer's injuries. In that second trial, the jury 
awarded Pryer $300,000. The guards appeal the District 
Court's rulings pertaining to the second trial. 
 
We will affirm the District Court's order for a new trial. 
However, because the issues of liability and damages were 
so intertwined as to make a fair trial on damages alone 
impossible, we will reverse and remand for a new trial on 
all issues. 
 
I. 
 
Pryer brought this action under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 alleging 
that he was subjected to excessive use of for ce on 
September 15 and 27, 1990, while imprisoned at the State 
Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh. In his complaint, 
Pryer named approximately forty defendants, including 
prison officials, medical personnel, and numer ous 
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correctional officers. Pryer sought compensatory and 
punitive damages for his injuries. The District Court 
dismissed the claims against the prison officials and the 
medical personnel, and the case proceeded to trial against 
nineteen guards: Gary Beck, Fred Bogonovich, Richard 
Bedilion, Douglas Cameron, Daniel Primm, Jacob Tokarski, 
Paul Trunick, Daniel Clarke, Robert Jef ferson, Perry 
Ciesielski, Bernard Jacobs, William Balzer, John Weaver, 
Daniel Caponi, Richard Slavec,1 David Cook, Gerald 
Prorock, Doyle Bursey, and Russell W ilson. Pryer appeared 
pro se in the three-day trial, which concerned both 
incidents and began February 22, 1999. 
 
A. 
 
The relevant facts established at trial ar e as follows. On 
September 15, 1990, the day of the first incident, Pryer was 
in the prison exercise yard when he began arguing and 
fighting with another inmate. Prison guards broke up the 
fight and handcuffed Pryer, then transferred him to the 
Restricted Housing Unit ("RHU") where he was placed in the 
custody of Officers Balzer, Caponi, W eaver, Bogonovich, and 
Beck. 
 
According to Pryer, these officers began beating him in 
the hallway near the RHU while admitting him to the 
cellblock. Pryer testified that, without pr ovocation and while 
in handcuffs, these five officers punched him with fists, 
struck him with nightsticks, kicked him repeatedly while he 
was lying on the ground, and eventually knocked him 
unconscious. Further, Pryer testified that, as a result of the 
incident, he suffered bruises, welts, and abrasions. In 
contrast, Balzer testified that, when Pryer was br ought to 
the RHU, his handcuffs were removed as a preliminary step 
to a strip search. According to Balzer , Pryer then began 
screaming and punched Balzer in the face. Balzer testified 
that he, Weaver, and Caponi used for ce to subdue Pryer. He 
said that the officers eventually strip-sear ched Pryer and 
placed him in a cell. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In their briefs, the parties apparently agree that "C.O. 3 Slavic" is 
Lt. 
Richard Slavec, and thus, we have adher ed to this corrected spelling 
despite the official caption. 
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The next incident took place on September 27, 1990 as 
Pryer was being searched before going outside for exercise. 
While being searched, Pryer complained that Officer Wilson, 
who was conducting the search, had impr operly fondled his 
buttocks, so he requested that another guar d complete the 
search. That request led to an exchange of words and, 
according to Pryer, Wilson punched him in the face. Officers 
Caponi and Bursey then began beating Pryer with their 
fists and batons, and kicked him to the gr ound. Bursey 
called for help, and Officers Slavec, Primm, Pr orock, and 
Trunick arrived in response. 
 
At this point, according to Pryer, while he was on the 
floor, Slavec ordered his subor dinates to stop hitting Pryer, 
and he handcuffed Pryer's hands behind his back. Shortly 
thereafter, all of the officers continued the beating. Pryer 
was then dragged outside the building, and led to an 
elevator that would take him to the third floor of the RHU. 
He claims that Officers Prorock, Bursey, Caponi, and Slavec 
subjected him to additional beatings inside the elevator and 
along the walkway on the third floor. He said that, at the 
entrance to the third floor cells, Officers Cameron, 
Tokarski, Jefferson, Ciesielski, Jacobs, and Cook met him 
with a barrage of nightstick blows and that Primm and 
Trunick also participated. 
 
According to Pryer, Officers Slavec, Bursey, Cook, and 
other guards then led Pryer into an isolation cell where they 
continued the beatings. There, Slavec jammed a nightstick 
into his eye and ordered the others to br eak his hands and 
legs. The officers then held Pryer down to the cell floor, and 
struck his hands and legs with nightsticks. Cook also 
jumped from a cell bed onto Pryer's stomach, and Cameron 
and Jacobs used a stun gun on him. 
 
Pryer introduced medical records to prove his injuries. He 
testified, without dispute, that two bones on his left hand 
and three on his right hand were br oken; his lower left leg 
was fractured in two places; he was bleeding fr om the 
mouth; he urinated blood; his body was cover ed with 
bruises; and he had welts on his face, bumps on his head, 
a swollen eye, and split lips. Further, Pryer testified that, as 
a result of the incident, he received stitches to his head and 
lower left leg and his left leg was put in a cast. 
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Although not all of the officers testified during the trial, 
their version of the events differed markedly from Pryer's 
testimony. According to the officers, Pryer had initiated the 
second incident by punching Wilson in the face and Caponi 
in the head. Wilson testified that he had used his baton on 
Pryer five to ten times, aiming below Pryer's left knee. 
Bursey testified that Pryer struck him as well. According to 
the officers, Pryer was forcibly resisting a search and had to 
be subdued, ultimately by the use of mace, then stripped 
and searched by the guards. 
 
At the close of evidence, the District Court, on its own 
motion, entered a directed verdict in favor of eleven officers: 
Beck, Bogonovich, Bedilion, Cameron, Primm, T okarski, 
Clarke, Jefferson, Ciesielski, Jacobs, and T runick. In so 
ruling, the court stated that Pryer had "failed even to 
mention some of [the guards during his testimony], and in 
other respects his evidence rose no higher than [that the 
guards] were simply present at the scene but were not 
identified as having caused him any harm in any way." 
Pryer objected to this ruling at trial, but does not raise it 
here on appeal. The trial judge's ruling left a total of eight 
officers for the jury's consideration. 
 
The judge then instructed the jury on the principles 
governing Eighth Amendment prison excessive force claims. 
However, on the issue of damages, the court only informed 
the jury that Pryer would be entitled to compensation for all 
injuries that were proximately caused by the officers' 
conduct. The court did not instruct the jury as to what 
kinds of injuries were compensable under S 1983, and did 
not inform the jury that it could awar d money damages for 
intangible harms, such as physical and emotional pain, 
humiliation, and fear engendered by a beating. Finally, the 
court informed the jury that it must r eturn an award of 
damages in the nominal amount of one dollar if Pryer failed 
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he 
suffered any actual injury or damages. Pryer, who was 
proceeding pro se, did not object to these instructions. 
 
After deliberating for a little over five and a half hours, 
the jury found in favor of four guards (Balzer , Caponi, 
Weaver, and Wilson), but r eturned a general liability verdict 
against the other four (Slavec, Cook, Pror ock, and Bursey). 
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The jury awarded $1.00 in nominal damages and no 
compensatory or punitive damages. 
 
B. 
 
On March 10, 1999, the District Court, on its own 
motion, vacated the damages award and or dered a new trial 
against Slavec, Cook, Prorock, and Bursey limited to the 
issue of damages. In its written decision, the court held 
that the jury's verdict on damages was against the weight 
of the evidence and that a new trial was "necessary to avoid 
a miscarriage of justice." Additionally, the court ruled that 
its instructions to the jury as to both compensatory and 
nominal damages were, respectively, inadequate and legally 
erroneous. Specifically, the court recognized that it had 
erred "by failing to instruct the jury that it could consider 
plaintiff 's pain, suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life in 
affixing compensatory damages." The court also held that, 
given Pryer's undisputed proof of actual injury, an 
instruction on nominal damages was inappropriate. 
Notably, the judge did not state any reasons for limiting the 
second trial to the issue of damages. 
 
C. 
 
On February 22, 2000, after appointing counsel to 
represent Pryer, the court commenced the second trial.2 
This trial focused only on the damages caused by the 
second incident.3 The court began the trial by reading a 
stipulation of facts and a summary of the medical r ecords 
describing Pryer's injuries. Pryer then testified at length 
against Slavec, Cook, Prorock, and Bursey, and he provided 
detailed testimony regarding the natur e and extent of his 
injuries. At several times during the course of the trial, the 
District Court precluded defense counsel fr om arguing that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Court takes this opportunity once again to express its 
appreciation to Jere Krakoff, Esq., Cathy Bissoon, Esq., and the law firm 
of Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay, LLP for agreeing to represent Pryer in 
this case. 
 
3. All of the officers implicated in the first incident were either 
dismissed 
by the court or exonerated by the jury. 
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Pryer's injuries were apportionable among the various 
officers, some of whom were no longer defendants in the 
action. On March 3, 2000, the court issued a detailed 
written explanation for this ruling, which r elied primarily 
on the principles of joint and several liability, and 
indivisible harm, found in the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts. Following detailed instructions on damages, the jury 
awarded Pryer $300,000 in compensatory damages against 
all four officers. 
 
On March 13, 2000, the defendants moved for a new trial 
on the issue of damages or, in the alter native, to reduce the 
amount of the verdict on the grounds that the court had 
erroneously instructed the jury that the four officers were 
responsible for all injuries sustained in the course of the 
incident. The motion was denied. The four officers now 
appeal the District Court's order of a new trial limited solely 
to damages and the court's ruling precluding defense 
counsel from arguing the issue of causation to the jury. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court exercised jurisdiction over this case 
under 28 U.S.C. SS 1331 and 1334. We have jurisdiction to 
hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. W e review a 
district court's order granting or denying a new trial for 
abuse of discretion, unless the court's decision is based 
upon the application of a legal precept, in which case we 
exercise plenary review. Failla v. City of Passaic, 146 F.3d 
149, 152 (3d Cir. 1998).4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. At the outset, we note that the District Court articulated no rationale 
in summarily ordering that "a new trial will be held in this case on the 
issue of damages." Ordinarily, where a trial court fails to explain its 
grounds for exercising discretion, and its reasons for doing so are not 
otherwise apparent from the recor d, we are left without any meaningful 
manner in which to review that ruling. Becker v. Arco Chem. Co., 207 
F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2000). In those circumstances, we need not defer 
to the trial court's ruling and may undertake to examine the record and 
make our own determination. See, e.g., id. (independently reviewing trial 
court's denial of evidentiary objection). Mor eover, in this case, as we 
discuss later, the District Court's or der of a partial new trial turns on 
the 
application of a legal precept to the evidence adduced at trial. 
Therefore, 
we will apply a plenary or de novo standar d of review. 
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A. 
 
We first conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in ordering a new trial. A trial court is 
empowered to order a new trial on its own initiative "for any 
reason that would justify granting one on a party's motion." 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(d). A new trial may be granted when the 
verdict is contrary to the great weight of the evidence; that 
is, "where a miscarriage of justice would r esult if the verdict 
were to stand." Olefins Trading, Inc. v. Han Yang Chem 
Corp., 9 F.3d 282, 289 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal quotations 
and citations omitted). 
 
Generally, "damages are available under[S 1983] for 
actions `found . . . to have been violative of . . . 
constitutional rights and to have caused compensable 
injury.' " Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255 (1978) 
(internal quotations, citations, and emphasis omitted). 
However, "substantial damages should be awarded only to 
compensate actual injury." Id. at 266. Where a 
constitutional deprivation has not caused actual injury, an 
award of nominal damages may be appropriate. See id. But 
nominal damages may only be awarded in the absence of 
proof of actual injury. See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. 
Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 n.11 (1986) ("[N]ominal 
damages . . . are the appropriate means of`vindicating' 
rights whose deprivation has not caused actual, pr ovable 
injury."); Carey, 435 U.S. at 248, 266-67 (approving 
recovery of nominal damages without proof of actual 
injury). 
 
In his written opinion, the District Judge r ecognized that 
he had erroneously instructed the jury on nominal damages 
and failed to inform it of the availability of compensatory 
damages for pain and suffering. Pryer plainly testified as to 
both the subjective and physical manifestations of injuries 
he sustained as a result of the incident on September 27, 
1990. Pryer further supported this testimony with objective 
medical records. The guards, however , neither introduced 
evidence to dispute that Pryer had, in fact, suf fered these 
injuries, nor challenged their nature, extent, and 
seriousness. Given this evidence, the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in concluding that an awar d of only 
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$1.00 in nominal damages was against the weight of the 
evidence and that a new trial was requir ed. 
 
We also agree with the trial judge that his charge did not 
fairly and adequately instruct the jury as to the applicable 
law on damages, and thus, did not provide the guidance 
necessary for a determination of an appr opriate award. 
"The standard of review for the district court's ruling on 
points for charge is . . . abuse of discr etion." Link v. 
Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 788 F .2d 918, 922 (3d Cir. 
1986). Where a jury charge is alleged to have stated an 
incorrect legal standard, "we will r eview the charge as a 
whole in the light of the evidence to determine if it fairly 
and adequately submitted the issues to the jury and we will 
reverse if the instructions were capable of confusing and 
thereby misleading the jury." Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 
F.2d 457, 462 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). 
 
In S 1983 actions, damages for violations of constitutional 
rights "may include not only out-of-pocket loss and other 
monetary harms, but also such injuries as impairment of 
reputation . . . , personal humiliation, and mental anguish 
and suffering." Stachura, 477 U.S. at 307 (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). The court's err or in 
failing to instruct as to the availability of damages for such 
intangible harms, coupled with its emphasis on nominal 
damages, rendered the totality of the instructions confusing 
and misleading. See Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Wyman, 718 F.2d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1983). Moreover, the error 
was fundamental because the incomplete instructions 
prevented the jury from considering intangible injuries such 
as pain and suffering. See Levinson v. Pr entice-Hall, Inc., 
868 F.2d 558, 564-65 (3d Cir. 1989). Under these 
circumstances, we conclude that the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial. 
 
B. 
 
Notwithstanding this result, the guards claim that, 
because the issues of liability and damages wer e so closely 
interrelated, the new trial should have been extended to all 
issues. The guards infer from the first verdict that the jury 
had not completely accepted Pryer's version of the facts, 
 
                                9 
  
and thus, they accuse the trial court of substituting its 
judgment for the jury's findings by effectively holding the 
four remaining officers responsible for all injuries. 
 
Pryer, however, contends that the guar ds were well aware 
before the commencement of the second trial that 
testimony would be elicited about the underlying incident. 
Moreover, he notes that the guar ds did not make a motion 
in limine or other objection during the second trial, and in 
fact fully participated in the development of the trial record, 
including the drafting of certain stipulated facts and the 
presentation of conflicting testimony and evidence about 
the events of September 27, 1990. Thus, accor ding to Pryer, 
the District Court properly permitted both parties to 
present evidence concerning liability to the extent that such 
evidence was relevant to the issue of damages, thereby 
eliminating any threat of injustice. 
 
District courts are authorized to grant new trials as "to 
all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues." 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a). In this regar d, we are guided by the 
Supreme Court's pronouncement in Gasoline Products Co. 
v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 500 (1931): "Where 
the practice permits a partial new trial, it may not properly 
be resorted to unless it clearly appears that the issue to be 
retried is so distinct and separable fr om the others that a 
trial of it alone may be had without injustice." Consistent 
with these principles, a new trial limited solely to damages 
is improper where "the question of damages . . . is so 
interwoven with that of liability that the for mer cannot be 
submitted to the jury independently of the latter without 
confusion and uncertainty, which would amount to a denial 
of a fair trial." Id. That is, "[t]he grant of a partial new trial 
is appropriate `only in those cases wher e it is plain that the 
error which has crept into one element of the verdict did 
not in any way affect the determination of any other 
issue.' " Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 233 F .3d 734, 758 (3d Cir. 
2000) (quoting Romer v. Baldwin, 317 F .2d 919, 922-23 (3d 
Cir. 1963) (internal quotations and citation omitted)). 
 
In the seventy years since the Gasoline Pr oducts decision, 
we have steadfastly applied this standard "to prevent 
limited new trials where a tangled or complex fact situation 
would make it unfair to one party to determine damages 
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apart from liability, or where `ther e is reason to think that 
the verdict may represent a compr omise among jurors with 
different views on whether defendant was liable.' " Vizzini v. 
Ford Motor Co., 569 F.2d 754, 760 (3d Cir. 1977) (citing 6A 
Moore's Federal Practice P 59.06, at 59-89 (1973) and 
quoting 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure S 2814, at 96 (1973)). See, e.g., Simone v. Golden 
Nugget Hotel and Casino, 844 F.2d 1031, 1041 (3d Cir. 
1988) (affirming new trial order on all issues for false 
imprisonment claim where jury "would first have to find at 
what points the unlawful detention began and ended," and 
it would additionally have to assess defendant's conduct in 
determining whether punitive damages wer e warranted); 
Spence v. Board of Educ. of the Christina Sch. Dist., 806 
F.2d 1198, 1201-02 (3d Cir. 1986) (affirming new trial order 
on all issues where plaintiff 's claim for emotional distress 
damages had to be evaluated in light of all cir cumstances 
surrounding alleged misconduct, and because plaintiff 
sought punitive damages, which required pr esentation to 
jury of all facts leading up to alleged adverse employment 
decision). 
 
By contrast, where the error on appeal r equiring a new 
trial related peculiarly to the damages portion of the trial 
only, and did not implicate the jury's liability ver dict, we 
have permitted a new trial limited only to the issue of 
damages. See, e.g., Wagner v. Reading Co., 428 F.2d 289, 
291-93 (3d Cir. 1970) (remanding for new trial on damages 
after holding that exclusion of plaintiff 's evidence of wage 
records, which related only to damages issue, was 
prejudicial error). 
 
A review of the first trial's transcript plainly reveals that 
the incident on September 27 involved a "tangled or 
complex fact situation." Both sides vigor ously contested 
liability. Pryer presented, in addition to himself, two other 
inmates who witnessed portions of the incident, while seven 
correctional officers testified on behalf of the defense. Pryer 
also introduced uncontroverted testimonial evidence and 
objective medical records to substantiate his extensive 
injuries resulting from the beating. Based upon the 
evidence adduced at trial, Pryer's injuries could be 
attributed to the guards' reasonable use of force, their 
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excessive use of force, his own actions, or some 
combination of these several factors. Moreover , while the 
first jury may have concluded that each of the guards in 
the present appeal used excessive force against Pryer, it is 
far from clear that Pryer's injuries cannot be apportioned 
based upon the nature and extent of his injuries, who was 
involved, and where the alleged beatings took place.5 
 
In particular, Wilson, who was only involved at the 
beginning of the September 27 incident, testified that Pryer 
had initiated the second incident by punching him in the 
head, to which he responded by striking Pryerfive to ten 
times on the lower left leg with his baton. Caponi, who 
appears to have been involved for a longer duration than 
Wilson, also testified that Pryer had punched him in the 
head. Caponi was among those guards who utilized force to 
subdue Pryer in response to his continued r esistance, 
which ultimately included the use of mace and a 
compulsory strip search. Pryer confir med this use of force, 
testifying that Caponi, among others, had repeatedly beat 
him with fists, batons, and kicks, eventually dragging him 
outside before leading him to the isolation cell on the third 
floor of the RHU. The jury, however, exonerated both Wilson 
and Caponi by finding that their use of for ce was 
reasonable under the circumstances. Thus, it is impossible 
from the record before us to determine whether the injuries 
sustained by Pryer resulted from W ilson's and Caponi's 
reasonable use of force, the other guar ds' excessive use of 
force, Pryer's own conduct, or some combination of these 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We do not agree with the District Court that Pryer suffered an 
indivisible injury and that the appellants wer e jointly and severally 
liable 
for the entire injury. On the contrary, for the reasons expressed in the 
text, we believe that there was a " `r easonable basis for division 
according 
to the contribution of each.' " SEC v. Hughes Capital Corp., 124 F.3d 
449, 455 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 
964 F.2d 252, 268-69 (3d Cir. 1992)); see also W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. 
Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts S 52, at 345 (5th 
ed. 1984) ("There will be obvious difficulties of proof as to the 
apportionment of certain elements of damages, such as physical and 
mental suffering and medical expenses, but such difficulties are not 
insuperable, and it is better to attempt some r ough division than to hold 
one defendant for the wound inflicted by the other ."). 
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possibilities not otherwise evident from the jury's general 
verdict. 
 
In short, the factual backdrop establishing the respective 
culpabilities of the various guards and Pryer himself is 
entangled within the assessment of the severity of Pryer's 
injuries. At its core, Pryer's claim is that he was the victim 
of excessive force at the hands of several officers -- and this 
cast of officers changed from scene to scene in the RHU 
much like the cast in a multiple-act play. In such a case, 
a jury assessing damages must know the precise factual 
context in which Pryer's injuries arose and who caused 
those injuries. Thus, this is a classic example of where a 
new trial on all issues is required under the Gasoline 
Products standard. 
 
Moreover, the probability that the verdict was tainted by 
compromise also leads us to favor a new trial on all issues.6 
In this respect, we have held that, "when a jury's verdict is 
obviously the result of a compromise on the questions of 
liability and damages, it is considered unjust to order a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Contrary to the dissent, we read the guar ds' brief as raising this 
argument. Most of their brief is devoted to their primary argument that 
the District Court should not have order ed a retrial at all. However, in 
the pages devoted to the fallback argument that any retrial should not 
have been limited to damages, the brief unquestionably raises the 
argument that the issues of liability and damages are so "intertwined" in 
this case that they cannot fairly be tried separately. A compromise 
verdict is simply one example of a type of case in which these issues are 
"intertwined"; it is not a separate ground for refusing to order a retrial 
on damages only. Moreover, the brief (at 22) refers expressly to this type 
of case. Citing Morrison Knudson Corp. v. Fir eman's Fund Ins. Co., 175 
F.3d 1221, 1255 (10th Cir. 1999), the brief states that one of "the two 
instances in which the Gasoline Products  rule warrants full retrials" is 
"when an insupportable damage award calls into question the original 
jury's finding on liability." As Morrison Knudson states on the cited 
page, 
"[t]he most common example is a compr omise verdict, i.e., an award of 
suspiciously low damages in a case of closely contested liability." 175 
F.3d at 1255. 
 
In addition, unlike the dissent, we do not believe that the guards' 
attorney made any statement at oral ar gument that may fairly be 
interpreted to mean that the first ver dict did not have the hallmarks of 
a compromise. 
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new trial on damages only." Rosa v. City of Chester, 278 
F.2d 876, 883 (3d Cir. 1960) (citations omitted). In this 
case, the award of $1.00 is not easy to r econcile with the 
uncontested evidence of injuries Pryer introduced. Indeed, 
we believe the verdict most likely repr esented a compromise 
among jurors with differing views on whether the 
correctional officers were liable. Her e, we are unable to 
understand why the first jury returned an award of only 
$1.00 after finding that four officers had used excessive 
force while two others had used only reasonable force. In 
such a case, a new trial should be granted on all issues. 
See, e.g., Stanton by Brooks v. Astra Pharma. Prods., Inc., 
718 F.2d 553, 576-77 (3d Cir. 1983) (ordering new trial on 
all issues where award was fairly small compared to 
reported verdicts for similar injuries to similarly situated 
plaintiffs, and far smaller than the evidence might have 
supported, thus strongly indicating that jury's verdict 
represented a compromise); accor d Lucas v. American Mfg. 
Co., 630 F.2d 291, 292-94 (5th Cir . 1980) (ordering new 
trial on all issues where jury's award of less than half of 
stipulated out-of-pocket losses was a compromise induced 
by trial judge's instruction rushing the jury to r each a 
verdict); Hatfield v. Seaboard Airline R.R. Co., 396 F.2d 721, 
723-24 (5th Cir. 1968) (ordering new trial on all issues 
where liability was hotly contested, and after lengthy 
deliberations, the jury's $1.00 award when plaintiff had 
uncontested special damages of $2,795.75 and substantial 
pain and suffering "can be seen only as the result of either 
a compromise on one of the liability issues or as an attempt 
to render a verdict for [the defendant] with [the defendant] 
paying the costs"); National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Great 
Lakes Warehouse Corp., 261 F .2d 35, 38 (7th Cir. 1958) 
(ordering new trial on all issues where it would be "absurd 
to say" jury's award of only one-half the amount of 
uncontested damages losses "was anything other than a 
compromise," especially when liability was vigorously 
contested); Schuerholz v. Roach, 58 F .2d 32, 34 (4th Cir. 
1932) (ordering new trial on all issues wher e jury's "grossly 
unjust and inadequate" award of $625 for plaintiff blinded 
in one eye "can give rise only to the infer ence" of a 
compromise verdict). 
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On this record, there is no r easonable basis for 
concluding with assurance that the questions of liability 
and damages were so separable that the jury's 
determination on one issue had no bearing on its 
determination on the other. Simply put, it is not "clearly 
apparent that the issue [of damages] is so distinct and 
separable from the [issue of liability] that a trial of it alone 
may be had without injustice." Pryer essentially argues that 
this error was cured by the parties' conduct during the 
second trial. However, this puts the cart before the horse as 
we must confine our review to the recor d before the District 
Court at the time when it made the decision to limit the 
trial solely to damages. Thus, neither the evidence 
subsequently introduced at the second trial, nor the higher 
verdict, are relevant. See, e.g. , Stanton, 718 F.2d at 577 
n.43 ("[W]e may not take this second, higher verdict into 
account in deciding whether the district court abused its 
discretion in limiting that new trial to damages."). 
 
Unlike a situation in which a discretionary ruling 
resulting in prejudice to a party is cur ed by a cautionary 
instruction during the trial, the unfairness to the guards 
occurred after the first verdict on the District Court's own 
initiative, thereby tainting any subsequent pr oceedings. 
Thus, on the record presented, we decline to adopt the 
practice urged by Pryer and promulgated in other circuits 
whereby new trials are permitted solely on damages with 
cautionary instructions to the second jury. See, e.g., Watts 
v. Laurent, 774 F.2d 168, 181-82 (7th Cir. 1985); Wheatley 
v. Beetar, 637 F.2d 863, 867-68 (2d Cir . 1980). A 
straightforward application of the Gasoline Products 
standard remains the law in this cir cuit. 
 
Therefore, we conclude that the District Court erred in 
limiting the scope of the new trial solely to damages. The 
proofs Pryer submitted, upon which the finding of liability 
rests, necessarily form the foundation for the award of 
damages. There was no conceivable fashion by which a 
second jury could fairly evaluate the extent of Pryer's 
damages without also fully appreciating the manner in 
which the force, both reasonable and excessive, gave rise to 
his injuries. Under the Gasoline Products  standard, the 
guards are entitled therefore to a new trial on all issues, 
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including liability, causation, and damages. See, e.g., 
Atkins v. New York City, 143 F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(ordering new trial on all issues because issue of liability 
was close and vigorously contested, and ver dict on damages 
was inconsistent with facts adduced at trial). 
 
III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that, while the 
District Court properly ordered a new trial after the first 
jury's nominal damages award, it erred in limiting the 
scope of the trial solely to damages. Accordingly, we will 
reverse the District Court's order granting a new trial and 
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
                                16 
  
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, and 
dissenting in part. 
 
Following an initial trial, despite an erroneous nominal 
damage award, Pryer had won something important: He 
had vindicated his constitutional rights by obtaining the 
formal determination of a jury that the savage beating 
administered to him by Appellants was wr ongful. Under the 
majority's ruling, that determination is taken away, even 
though no one contends that it was the product of any 
error. Solely because the guards benefitted from an 
erroneous instruction that contributed to an inadequate 
damages determination, the majority now holds that they 
must be accorded a further windfall by giving them a 
second bite at the liability issue. I respectfully dissent.1 
 
I. 
 
At the outset, it appears that the majority has failed to 
apply the appropriate standard of r eview. In Vizzini v. Ford 
Motor Co., 569 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1977), we first enunciated 
the scope of review to be applied in deter mining the 
appropriateness of an order limiting a new trial to damages. 
See id. at 760 ("[T]he standard we apply on review is 
whether, viewing the circumstances as a whole, it was 
consistent with the sound exercise of discr etion for the trial 
judge to limit the new trial to the issue of damages."); see 
also Stanton v. Astra Pharmaceutical Pr ods., Inc., 718 F.2d 
553, 576 & n.42 (3d Cir. 1983) (observing that "the only 
question is whether the district court abused its discretion 
in ordering" a partial new trial on damages).2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. I join, however, in Part II(A) of the majority's opinion, which upholds 
the District Court's decision setting aside the nominal damages verdict. 
2. Our application of an abuse of discretion standard is in keeping with 
the practice of other courts. See, e.g. Sprague v. Boston & Maine Corp., 
769 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 1985) (allowing separate retrial on damages and 
noting that "[t]he trial judge is affor ded broad latitude . . . to limit 
the 
new trial to the issue of damages if liability has, in his opinion, been 
competently determined by the jury") (citing cases); Young v. 
International 
Paper Co., 322 F.2d 820 (4th Cir. 1963) (affirming trial court's 
limitation 
to issue of damages and holding that trial judge, in reviewing record, 
could conclude that jury properly found defendants liable but verdict too 
low to be sustained). 
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The majority acknowledges the abuse of discr etion 
standard, but it effectively applies a de novo standard, 
reversing the trial court because this court is led to "favor 
a new trial on all issues" due to this court's inability to 
understand why the jury awarded only nominal damages. 
Supra at 13. I recognize that under Gasoline Products it 
must "clearly appear" that a partial r etrial may be had 
without injustice.3 Nevertheless, I believe that the required 
clarity is for the trial judge, whose view should pr evail even 
if the issue is less than clear to us as a r eviewing court. 
 
There is good reason to commit such matters to the 
sound discretion of the trial court. The trial court has seen 
all of the evidence first-hand. It has ruled on motions, 
instructed the jury, and overseen the conduct of trial. In 
short, the trial court has lived with and thought about the 
case for a considerable period, and so is in an 
advantageous position to determine what will or will not 
overtax the jury's discernment. We, on the other hand, 
upon review of a cold record, cannot be expected to achieve 
the same mastery of every nuance of the case. It is hardly 
surprising that, where a trial judge is justly assured that 
issues are separable, the matter may appear less clear to a 
reviewing court. 
 
Rather than reversing whenever we cannot be sur e that 
the issues are separable, I would uphold the trial court's 
exercise of discretion unless we could say with some 
assurance, based upon clearly identified factors in the 
record, that the issues are not separable.4 Because the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. See Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 500 
(1931) (holding that a partial new trial "may not be properly resorted to 
unless it clearly appears that the issue to be r etried is so distinct and 
separable from the others that a trial of it alone may be had without 
injustice"). See also, e.g., Williams v. Rene, 72 F.3d 1096, 1101 (3d Cir. 
1995) (holding that under Gasoline Products a new trial must extend to 
all issues where "the issue of damages . . . is so intertwined with 
liability 
that one cannot be submitted to the jury independently of the other 
without confusion and uncertainty."). 
 
4. An example of the appropriate level of deference may be found in 
Stanton, where we reversed the partial retrial only because a "great deal 
of evidence" in the record "strongly suggest[ed]" a compromise verdict, 
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majority's opinion in this case does not identify a record 
basis for finding an abuse of discretion by the District 
Court, it effectively leaves no discretion. This result is 
contrary to the purpose of the Gasoline Pr oducts rule in 
that it will preclude even justly limited r etrials, thereby 
thwarting judicial economy and unduly burdening plaintiffs 
who have already fairly obtained a favorable liability verdict. 
See Wheatley v. Beetar, 637 F.2d 863, 867-68 (2d Cir. 
1980) (noting that where defendant has had a fair trial on 
the issue of liability it would be "grossly unfair to plaintiff, 
as well as contrary to the spirit of F.R. 59, to require a 
retrial of the question of defendant's culpability" solely 
because the jury did not properly consider damages) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).5  
 
II. 
 
In deciding whether a new trial on damages alone would 
be unjust, it is not enough simply to observe that issues 
concerning damages and liability are interwoven. Of 
necessity they are always interrelated, because only those 
damages proximately caused by conduct giving rise to 
liability are recoverable. The universal r equirement of a 
causal link between liability and damages means that the 
issues can never be completely unlinked.6  
 
Nevertheless, it is clear that in many cases damages may 
justly be tried apart from liability. Such separate trials are 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
based on two objective factors: a comparison of the verdict amount to 
the evidence that provided a "compelling indication" of compromise, and 
the jury's answers to "special questions" that"apparently absolved [the 
defendant] of liability". Stanton, 718 F.2d at 576-78 & n.45. As discussed 
in Part II, below, no such compelling objective factors are present here. 
 
5. Moreover, in the present case, the majority has gone beyond simply 
substituting its judgment for that of the trial court: As will be 
explained 
below, the majority has based its decision on considerations that were 
not placed before the trial court. 
 
6. See Olsen v. Correiro, 1995 WL 62101 *3 (D. Mass., Feb. 3, 1995) 
(observing that the "interwoven" test of Gasoline Products is "quite 
difficult to apply in practice, for damages and liability are in some 
sense 
interwoven"). 
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a common occurrence, both ab initio and on retrial.7 See 
Rosa v. City of Chester, 278 F.2d 876, 882 (3d Cir. 1960) 
(observing that "[f]ederal appellate and district courts have 
time and again ordered new trials as to damages only"). See 
generally Propriety of Limiting to Issue of Damages Alone 
New Trial Granted on Ground of Inadequacy of Damages - 
Modern Cases, 5 A.L.R. 5th 875 at S 4 (1993) (providing 
extensive citations to cases where "new trial was required 
upon damages only, since defendant's liability was 
supported or established by the evidence and ther e was no 
necessity to retry the liability issue"). 
 
Assessment of the degree to which facts concer ning 
liability and damages are interrelated seems a quixotic 
venture with little direct bearing on the justice or injustice 
of separate trials; and it does not lead to any workable 
standard. A more serviceable approach is to consider 
whether there is something about how the interr elationship 
unfolded at trial that would make separation of the issues 
on retrial unjust. Courts have focused on two aspects in 
particular: whether the jury's erroneous tr eatment of 
damages infected its determination of liability, and whether 
it appears that the verdict on liability and damages together 
represents a compromise. See,e.g., Olsen v. Correiro, 1995 
WL 62101 *4 (D. Mass., Feb. 3, 1995) (observing that in 
determining "interwoven" test "some courts ask whether the 
invalidity of the jury's reasoning as to one part of the 
verdict could have `infected' their r easoning as to the other 
part" and that "[a] variation on the `infection' inquiry is the 
`compromise verdict' inquiry, under which a court asks . . . 
whether . . . an inadequate damages award r eflected the 
jury's ambivalence about its finding of liability"). 
 
The first test, then, is whether the error which 
undermined the damages verdict also corrupted the liability 
verdict. Apropos of this standard, we have held that "if the 
error compelling the reversal relates solely to the damage 
question, the new trial will be restricted to that question." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The rules expressly authorize such separate trials. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
42(b) (permitting, in furtherance of convenience or when conducive to 
expedition and economy, separate trial of any separate issue); Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 59(a) (permitting new trial on"all or part of the issues"). 
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Rosa, 278 F.2d at 883. Moreover , we have consistently 
recognized the propriety of partial new trials "in those cases 
where it is plain that the error which has crept into one 
element of the verdict did not in any way af fect the 
determination of any other issue." V inzinni, 569 F.2d at 760 
(quoting Romer v. Baldwin, 317 F.2d 919, 922-23 (3d Cir. 
1963)) (additional citations omitted). 
 
Here, there is no suggestion that the err oneous 
instructions or reasoning which necessitated r etrial as to 
damages had any bearing on the liability ver dict. The 
finding of liability was amply supported by the evidence, 
and Appellants have not assigned any error with respect 
thereto. I do not read the majority opinion as indicating 
that the liability verdict was erroneous. 
 
It is with respect to the second test for unfairness -- the 
"compromise verdict" inquiry -- that I must part ways with 
the majority. Appellants never took the position, either 
before the District Court or in briefing before this Court, 
that the liability verdict represented a compromise.8 
Ordinarily an appellate court will not r everse a trial court 
on grounds not asserted by the parties. Nevertheless, the 
majority opines that "the verdict most likely represented a 
compromise among jurors with differing views on whether 
the correctional officers were liable", because the majority is 
"unable to understand" why the jury would otherwise 
return an award of $1.00 despite Pryer's uncontested 
evidence of injuries. Supra at 14. 
 
A compromise verdict results when jur ors resolve their 
inability to make a determination with unanimity as to 
liability by finding inadequate damages. As the majority 
correctly observes, we have previously held that a limited 
new trial is unjust where the verdict is"obviously the result 
of compromise" on questions of liability and damages. Id. 
(citing Rosa, 278 F.2d 876).9 To avoid undue interference 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Indeed, when invited to adopt that position at oral argument, 
Appellants' counsel effectively declined to do so. 
 
9. It is significant that the statement in Rosa cited by the majority is 
followed immediately by an explicit recognition of the converse rule 
where there is no such obvious compr omise: "On the other hand if the 
error compelling the reversal relates solely to the damage question, the 
new trial will be restricted to that question." Rosa, 278 F.2d at 883. 
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with the trial court's discretion to limit a r etrial, we have 
required trial on all issues only wher e the compromise is 
"obvious". See Rosa, 278 F.2d at 883.10 This standard is in 
keeping with the practices of our sister Courts of Appeals.11 
It is not enough that the damage award is inadequate, or 
nominal.12 Rather, the compromise must be evident from 
other factors of record.13 Where the presence of compromise 
is doubtful, a new trial on liability is not r equired.14 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Cf. Huddleston v. Crain Brothers, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Pa. 
1960) (concluding new trial on damages alone was appropriate where 
verdict was not "absolutely the r esult of a compromise on liability and 
damages") (emphasis added) (citing Rosa, 278 F.2d 876). 
 
11. See Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1487 (11th Cir. 
1983) (defining compromise verdict as"one where it is obvious that the 
jury compromised the issue of liability by awar ding inadequate 
damages.") (emphasis added); Freight T erminals, Inc. v. Ryder System, 
Inc., 461 F.2d 1046, 1053 (5th Cir. 1972) (same); Great Coastal Express, 
Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 511 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 
1975) (new trial required where inadequate verdict "could only have been 
a sympathy or compromise verdict") (emphasis added). See also Spell v. 
McDaniel, 604 F. Supp. 641, 653 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (finding new trial on 
damages proper where the "totality of the circumstances simply [did] not 
point unerringly to a compromise ver dict") (emphasis added). 
 
12. See Rosa, 278 F.2d 876 (inadequate verdict in amount of $1 held not 
indicative of compromise on issues of liability and damages). See also De 
Luca v. Wells, 297 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1968) (noting that not every inadequate 
verdict is ipso facto a compromiseverdict); Spell, 604 F. Supp. at653 
(holding that an award of minimal damages, in itself, is insufficient to 
prove a compromise) (citing Burger King, 710 F.2d at 1487). Cf. Edwards 
v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276, 282 (5th Cir. 1975) ("A jury's 
finding as to liability can be binding even though its monetary award is 
found to be [inadequate] or even improperly influenced - our deference 
to and faith in the jury system demands at least this much."). 
 
13. See Burger King, 710 F.2d at 1487; Mekdeci v. Merrell National 
Laboratories, 711 F.2d 1510, 1513-14 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 
14. Cf. Lockhart v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 43, 54 (3d Cir. 
1989), (rejecting claim for new trial although it "[could] not be said 
with 
fair assurance that [a compromise ver dict] did not occur", and noting 
that "[o]ur task on review is to ascertain only whether the jury's verdict 
is reasonable in light of the evidence pr esented, and not to indulge in 
unsubstantiated and speculative assertions"), effectively overruled on 
other grounds, Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993). 
 
                                22 
  
Here the presence of a compromise is certainly not 
obvious. That the jury was able to find some of the initial 
defendants liable and others not clearly demonstrates its 
ability to assess and distinguish conduct, and to adjust its 
liability findings accordingly. And unlike some of the cases 
relied upon by the majority, the jury in this case did not 
simply "split the difference" between the parties' positions 
in arriving at a damages figure. Measur ed against the 
extent of the beating and injuries inflicted on Pryer, an 
award of $1 hardly seems a "compr omise".15 
 
The majority does not point to any factors suggestive of 
compromise, other than the purportedly inexplicable 
deficiency in damages. But that deficiency is r eadily 
explained by the District Court's erroneous instructions. 
One need not reach out in search of speculative alternative 
explanations where the very reason for the new trial was 
the court's acknowledgment of its erroneous instructions 
on damages. To all appearances, the reason for the jury's 
nominal damages award was the court's err oneous 
instruction on that very issue, and not that the jury did not 
mean what it said as to liability.16 In Rosa, we found that 
an inadequate damages verdict was not indicative of 
compromise where the inadequacy was appar ently due to 
erroneous evidence and instructions.17 Numerous cases are 
in accord.18 In the pr esent case, we should similarly decline 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Compare Stanton, 718 F.2d at 576-77 (finding "compelling indication" 
of compromise in damages award of about one third of the amount 
supported by the evidence). 
 
16. Any doubt on this score should be r esolved by according the jury's 
liability verdict the usual presumption of propriety and regularity. See 
Spell, 604 F. Supp. at 651 (in conducting compromise inquiry, court 
started from proposition that jury's ver dict is to be afforded every 
inference that it is proper and honest). 
 
17. See Rosa, 278 F.2d at 882. 
 
18. See, e.g., Saide v. Stanton, 659 P.2d 35 (Ariz. 1983) (concluding new 
trial could be limited to damages alone, though liability issue was 
strongly contested, where inadequacy in damage award resulted from 
trial court's erroneous instructions to jury r egarding amounts includable 
in assessing damages); Capelouto v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 500 
P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972) (new trial properly limited to damages where ample 
evidence supported liability, and inadequacy of the verdict was probably 
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to presume that the liability verdict was a product of 
compromise.19 
 
III. 
 
Appellants have raised the possible apportionment of 
Pryer's injuries in a separate assignment of err or, 
contending that the trial court improperly pr evented the 
jury in the second trial from considering whether some or 
all of the injuries resulted from the conduct of guards who 
were absolved of liability in the first trial. If Appellants' 
contention were correct, they would be entitled to a new 
trial on damages, in which they could attempt to assign 
responsibility for particular injuries to the other guards. 
They would not, however, be entitled to r evisit the question 
of their own liability. 
 
Appellants' contention on apportionment turns on 
whether the evidence in the second trial would allow a non- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
due to erroneous jury instruction); Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. Corp. v. 
Silva, 476 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (affirming limitation of new 
trial to damages where inadequate award was apparently generated by 
trial court's instruction and case was not one wher e evidence of 
defendants' liability was tenuous or insubstantial, or where it appeared 
that juror who would have found no liability whatsoever compromised 
with those who would have found defendants liable, and observing that 
new trial on liability was not required simply because the issue was 
disputed). 
 
19. Some courts have employed an explicit multi-factorial analysis to 
determine whether a compromise ver dict was reached, based on: (1) 
clarity of the jury instructions and verdict form; (2) length of jury 
deliberations; (3) strength of the evidence as to liability; (4) questions 
and notes from the jury during deliberations; and (5) whether the case 
involved a sympathetic plaintiff and unsympathetic defendant. See, e.g., 
Mekdeci, 711 F.2d 1510; Spell, 604 F. Supp. at 651. Here, there is no 
indication that the liability instructions wer e unclear; that the jury 
deliberations were over-long; that liability evidence was lacking; that 
the 
jury asked questions evincing uncertainty; or that Pryer, an incarcerated 
felon, was a particularly sympathetic plaintiff. Compare Vizzini, 569 F.2d 
at 761 (requiring full retrial wher e liability evidence was "very thin" 
and 
jury's failure to agree on damages after two full days of deliberations 
indicated that deliberations were affected by liability issues). 
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speculative attribution of particular injuries to particular 
causes. The majority addresses this issue only in passing. 
While it does opine that "it is far from clear that Pryer's 
injuries cannot be apportioned", this comment appears to 
be part of its discussion of the first trial. See supra at 12.20 
Whether such an apportionment was supported by the 
evidence in the first trial is of no moment, since the 
majority has agreed with the District Court that the 
damages verdict was tainted by erroneous instructions that 
necessitated a new trial. 
 
The issue properly before us concer ns whether 
apportionment was proper on the recor d before the jury in 
the second trial (not whether the first jury could or did 
apportion damages). As to that issue, Appellants had the 
burden of providing a record basis for non-speculative 
attribution of particular injuries to particular causes.21 
Appellants do not attempt to parse the recor d to show how 
such a determination could be made; nor does the majority. 
Appellants merely point out (and the majority r epeats) that 
one non-liable guard admitted to beating Pryer on the leg 
which was broken. But this was only one beating in a long- 
running melee that included other assaults to the same leg. 
It appears that any conclusion that one guar d's conduct 
was the sole cause of that injury would be speculative. 
 
As the District Court held, 
 
       The evidence in this case clearly established that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. The majority appears to intimate that thefirst jury might have 
arrived at its $1 verdict by determining that all of the substantial 
elements of damage were caused by guards found not liable. This may 
be possible in theory, but given the usual r elationship between force and 
injury, it is hardly plausible that a jury would find that guards who 
inflicted multiple broken bones, lacerations, contusions and head 
injuries used only reasonable force, while concluding that the force used 
by those who did only nominal damage was excessive. 
 
21. See, e.g., United States v 
              . Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 268- 
69 (3d Cir. 1992) ("[W]here joint tortfeasors cause a single and 
indivisible 
harm for which there is no reasonable basis for division according to the 
contribution of each, each tortfeasor is subject to liability for the 
entire 
harm. . . . . [I]t is the tortfeasor's burden to establish that the 
damages 
are capable of such apportionment."). 
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       plaintiff suffered a single indivisible injury caused by 
       multiple blows inflicted by multiple guards. There is no 
       logical, reasonable or practical basis to apportion his 
       pain, suffering . . . between the blows inflicted by the 
       four defendants and the blows inflicted by the other 
       guards, or to attribute such injuries to the blows 
       inflicted by any particular guard. Any attempt to do so 
       would be purely arbitrary. 
 
Mem., March 3, 2000, at 6. Because nothing in Appellants' 
submission or the majority's opinion convinces me that the 
court's analysis was incorrect, I would uphold its refusal to 
allow the jury to speculate as to apportionment of Pryer's 
damages. 
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